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SEPARATE BUT EQUAL-AN ANALYSIS OF STATE CIVIL RIGHTS




The eroded "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson1 may find
new life in a different civil rights context. A federal district court recently an-
nounced that state or local civil rights agencies operate under a constitutional
mandate to provide victims of discrimination the rights and remedies equivalent
to those provided them under federal civil rights law.'
During the past year, several other federal decisions have directed attention
to state or local civil rights agencies and raise questions as to their interaction
with federal law. In Lopez v. State Foundry and Machine, Inc.,' a federal
court held that an aggrieved party could seek vindication of his rights under the
1964 Civil Rights Act, including financial remuneration, even though the action
had previously been before a state agency and he had signed a settlement with
the employer. Also, the Sixth Circuit Court in Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc.'
disregarded the decision of the Kentucky Civil Rights Commission and permitted
civil rights plaintiffs to recover monetary relief which had been previously denied
them by the State Commission. In Tillman v. Wheaton-Hauen Recreation
Association, Inc.5 the plaintiffs had obtained relief from a local civil rights agency
but no monetary damages.6 Instead of pursuing their state relief, they chose the
federal scheme which ultimately provided them with relief not provided by the
local agency.
The purpose of this article is to explore the role of state civil rights agencies
within the context of federalism, analyze their effectiveness, and suggest the
course of their future activities. For purposes of illustrating the state admin-
istrative process, the author has chosen the procedures of Maryland Commission
on Human Relations (Md. COHR) whose structure and history are similar to
that of most state civil rights agencies.'
* General Counsel, Maryland Commission on Human Relations; B.S., 1958, University of
Notre Dame; J.D., 1968, Catholic University. Opinions expressed in this article are those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission.
1 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2 Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 331 F. Supp. 4 (D. Neb. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 459
F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1972).
3 336 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Wise. 1972).
4 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972).
5 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
6 1 RAcE REL. L. SuRvy 231 (1970).
7 MD. ANN. Corma, Art. 49B, § 1 et seq. (1972 Repl. Vol., 1972 Supp.). For a compara-
tive study of state agencies see Bonfield, An Institutional Analysis of the Agencies Administering
Fair Employment Practices Laws, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 823, 1035 (1967); Sutin, The Experience
of State Fair Employment Commissions: A Comparative Study, 18 VAND. L. REv. 965 (1965).
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II. History
State civil rights enforcement agencies preceded the modern federal civil
rights laws; the first state agencies were established in New York and Wisconsin
in 1945.' Although many of the early state agencies were concentrated in the
midwest and northeast industrial states,9 these agencies gradually expanded into
all areas except the South. By 1965 23 states had established such agencies.?'
The typical pattern of development involved the establishment of an advisory
commission with little power followed by the enactment of substantive laws,
first in public accommodations, then in employment, and finally in housing.
There are approximately 40 states and 400 municipalities which have civil rights
agencies which are similar in purpose but which vary considerably in degree of
coverage and in sanctions imposed upon those who discriminate."
A. The Maryland Experience
In Maryland, the foundation was laid for the present structure of the Md.
COHR in 1927 with the establishment of the Interracial Commission, an ad-
visory agency designed to consider the welfare of "colored people residing in the
State."12 The Interracial Commission was given neither a substantive law to
administer, nor any enforcement powers. Since 1927 this Commission has ex-
perienced several name changes: Commission for Colored Problems," Commis-
sion on Interracial Problems and Relations, 4 and finally, the State of Maryland
Commission on Human Relations. 5
In 1963, the Commission took on the responsibility of adminstering the
first substantive civil rights law in the state, a prohibition against discrimination
in places of public accommodations.' Two years later, in 1965, the Commission
was given added authority to administer a prohibition against employment dis-
crimination.' 7 These two provisions are patterned after their federal counterparts
contained in Title II (public accommodations) and Title VII (employment) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' At that time, however, the Commission was
provided neither adequate staff to administer these laws nor provided with clear
sanctions to enforce them. 9 Consequently, despite the law, state civil rights en-
forcement was nonexistent.
8 N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972); Wrsc. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31-.36
(1957).
9 Witherspoon, Civil Rights Policy in the Federal System: Proposals for a Better Use of
Administrative Process, 74 YAE L.J. 1171, 1239-42 (1965).
10 Id.
11 U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HISTORICAL OVERVIEw-EquAL
OPPORTUNITY ON HISTORY (1972); Note, Municipal Fair Employment Practices Ordinances
and Commissions: A Legal Survey and Model Ordinance, 45 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 258
(1970); Equal Employment Opportunities, CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 1 20,080 (1973).
12 Chap. 559, Laws of Maryland (1927).
13 Chap. 431, Laws of Maryland (1943).
14 Chap. 548, Laws of Maryland (1951).
15 Chap. 83, Laws of Maryland (1958).
16 Chap. 227, Laws of Maryland (1963).
17 Chap. 717, Laws of Maryland (1965).
18 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. and §§ 2000e et seq. (1970).




During the period between 1969 and 1971 the Md. COHR underwent a
dramatic change. The staff was increased from eight to fifty positions,
20 the law
was amended to provide for administrative sanctions against those in violation of
law,2 and a strong fair housing law was enacted
2 2-- one which is identical in all
substantive respects to the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1968.23 Also, during that
period, the Commission experienced a dramatic increase in the number of
charges of discrimination filed. While in the years 1963 through 1968 only 454-
cases had been filed from throughout the state,
24 426 were filed for in 1969
alone; since that time the case load has approximately doubled in each succeed-
ing year.
21
B. Past Effectiveness of State Laws
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, the United
States Supreme Court in Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Con-
tinental Air Lines, Inc.26 thwarted a constitutional challenge to the action of a
state agency in regulating employment discrimination by an interstate carrier.
This decision accorded considerable weight to the action of state civil rights
agencies and could have operated as a catalyst for vigorous law enforcement by
state commissions. Nevertheless, the state agencies during that period were
notorious for their passivity and ineffectiveness.
The history [of state civil rights agencies] is one of timidity in investigations,
vacillation in decisionmaking, and soft settlements which failed to aid the
victim of discrimination and did not remedy the broader social problems.
2 '
Many reasons have been assigned for this failure: limited coverage of existing
laws, inadequate budget and staff, lack of political support, and untrained com-
missioners and staff. 8 The major reasons, however, were twofold. First, state
agencies predicated a finding of discrimination upon proof of a defendant's
subjective intent to discriminate." Second, state agency inquiry focused on the
effect of a discriminatory practice as it related to an individual complainant and
not the institutional causes of the discrimination."
0
20 MARYLAND COMM'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1970).
21 Chap. 83, Laws of Maryland (1968).
22 Chap. 324, Laws of Maryland (1971). A prior fair housing act, Chap. 385, Laws of
Maryland (1967), had been passed by the Maryland legislature in 1967 but was petitioned to
referendum and defeated at the general election in November, 1968. After Governor Spiro T.
Agnew left office to assume the Vice-Presidency, he was succeeded to the governorship by the
Speaker of the House of Delegates, Marvin Mandel, who then promoted the new fair housing
law which eventually was enacted without incident.
23 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970).
24 MARYLAND COMM'N ON INTERRACIAL PROBLEMS AND RELATIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 10
(1968).
25 MARYLAND COMM'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1973).
26 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
27 A. BLUMROSEN, BLAcK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 6 (1971).
28 Id. at 6-27; Witherspoon, supra note 9, at 1180-87; Minsky, FEPC in Illinois: Four
Stormy Years, 41 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 152 (1965); Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employ-
ment Practices Commission: A Critical Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BUFFALO L. REv.
22 (1964).
29 Sutin, supra note 7, at 994.
30 A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 27, at 12.
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Several early state decisions illustrate this dilemma. In Draper v. Clark
Dairy, Inc.,3 1 a Connecticut court reviewed a finding of employment discrimina-
tion made by a local commission. A black male had applied for a job at a dairy
which had an all white work force but was rejected. Despite the applicant's
qualifications to perform the job and the existence of a job vacancy at the time
of his application, the defendant argued that no intent to discriminate had been
proven. In struggling with the question of intent, the court fashioned a liberal
inference to be drawn from the facts to support a finding of intent to discriminate
and thus upheld the Commission's finding. However, the court held the Com-
mission's order was improper since it sought to enjoin future discriminatory
hiring practices. In effect, the court limited the inquiry of the civil rights agency
to the individual complainant and prevented any class relief. Later in Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 35 v. Commission on Civil
Rights2 another Connecticut court allowed liberal inferences to support a find-
ing of intent to discriminate and left undisturbed the Commission's order finding
employment discrimination on the basis of race. Nevertheless, in Motorola, Inc.
v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission, 3 where the question of intent
was again present, the court applied a stricter standard which limited the in-
ferences the Commission would be permitted to draw. The Commission's order
was reversed because of the failure to prove intent to discriminate on the part of
Motorola.
Proof of intent to discriminate posed a serious problem to state agencies
since the requisite was almost impossible to prove absent an outright admission.
Some state courts, however, did allow circumstantial evidence to meet the intent
requisite. The New York Court of Appeals stated the basis for this principle in
Holland v. Edwards:
One intent on violating the Law Against Discrimination cannot be expected
to declare or announce his purpose. Far more likely is it that he will pursue
his discriminatory practices in ways that are devious, by methods subtle
and elusive-for we deal with an area in which "subtleties of conduct ...
play no small part .... ."34
Federal courts also struggled with intent as a requisite necessary to prove dis-
crimination, and as late as 1969 a federal district court included proof of a
defendant's intent as a necessary element of proof in a housing discrimination
case.35 The requisite of intent did not fully disappear until the Supreme Court
announced its landmark decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co."6 The Griggs
decision removed this heavy, if not impossible, burden of proof which, no doubt,
extended the time necessary to investigate a complaint, and encouraged agencies
to settle or dismiss cases without an evidentiary hearing.
State civil rights agencies also limited the scope of their inquiry to include
31 17 Conn. Supp. 93, 1 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES DEcisioNs 11 9620 (Super. Ct.
1950).
32 140 Conn. 537, 102 A.2d 366 '(1953).
33 34 Ili. 2d 266, 215 N.E.2d 286 (1966).
34 307 N.Y. 38, 40; 119 N.E.2d 581, 584 (1954) (citations omitted).
35 Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
36 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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only the individual and not systematic discriminatory practices. This practice
elicited severe criticism of the agencies' effectiveness. 7 The unchanged minority
housing and unemployment patterns in those jurisdictions with civil rights laws
were cited as illustrations of the inadequacy of the individual approach. 8 After
appraising the ineffectiveness of state and local civil rights agencies, the Kerner
Commission in 1968 recommended that these agencies broaden the scope of their
inquiry and apply the enforcement effort not only for the benefit of an individual
who filed a complaint, but also against broad patterns of discrimination."s
C. Deueloping Federal-State Interaction
With the stimuli of the Supreme Court decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.4" giving new life to long-dormant federal civil rights laws and the enactment
and enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 41 state agencies have
begun to develop new patterns of enforcement. After 1968, the increasing civil
rights activity on the federal level also had the effect of promoting the enactment
of more civil rights laws in most states outside the South and expanding the
coverage in those states already possessing civil rights laws. Today most state
commissions operate as law enforcement agencies with a mandate and coverage
similar and often identical to that of the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) and the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). The changing enforcement patterns of state agencies
resulted from the pressure of federal action and training and dissemination of
federal standards by such organizations as EEOC's Office of State and Com-
munity Affairs and the International Organization of Official Human Rights
Agencies.4 2
Both Title II (public accommodations) and Title VII (employment) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title VIII (housing) of the Civil Rights Act of
1968 provide an opportunity for the state or local agency to deal with discrimina-
tion charges first.43 With the passage of these acts, Congress clearly intended to
promote the concept of federalism by insuring close working relationships
between the federal and the state agencies as the most effective means of eliminat-
ing discrimination. Congress with the enactment of these laws has made it
clear that the federal civil rights scheme is to be implemented by local civil rights
agencies.44
37 See generally, A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 27; Hill, supra note 28; Sutin, supra note 7.
38 A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 27, at 7.
39 U.S. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, R.PoRT 78-79 (1968).
40 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
41 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. and §§ 3601 et seq. (1970).
42 Many new enforcement practices have been developed by Professor Alfred Blumrosen,
Rutgers Law School, and have been adopted by various state agencies.
43 The coverage of a protected class usually includes race, color, creed, ancestry, age, sex,
and national origin. The coverage of subject matter includes public accommodations, employ-
ment, and housing in both the public and private sectors with various exemptions carved out
of the statutory scheme. With the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), Title VII jurisdiction has been extended to prohibit employment
discrimination by state and local governments. State agencies have been encouraged to similarly
amend state civil rights laws and in fact have been given a deadline to do so in order to main-
tain their federal relationship. See 38 Fed. Reg. 16672 (1973).
44 Title II, Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 207(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6 (1970); Title VII,
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This opportunity is effectuated through a deferral process whereby com-
plaints of discrimination first filed with the federal government are sent to the
state agency if the agency has been certified by the federal government as provid-
ing rights and remedies substantially equivalent to federal laws.45 The EEOC
deferral process received approval by the Supreme Court in Love v. Pullman
Co." Federal law provides that the federal government may proceed with the
discrimination charge after a specified period of time, but the practice of many
federal regional offices is to allow the state agency to complete its action on the
charge. The results of such state action are given substantial weight by the
federal agencies.
IIL. Administrative Structure of State Agencies
Unlike the federal civil rights scheme which provides for direct court action
to determine the merits of a charge of discrimination, most state commissions
operate under an administrative structure which authorizes the agency to issue
orders to "cease and desist" from the discriminatory practices identified and to
take "such affirmative action" as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes
of the law. Such administrative orders are usually either directly enforceable in
state courts or are reviewable by the state court on direct appeal. It should be
noted that the proponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 unsuccessfully sought
to have this "cease and desist" authority vested in the EEOC, and the failure to
include this authority brought predictions of ineffectiveness.48 Nevertheless, the
federal scheme has produced a remarkable number of favorable civil rights
decisions and has effectively rebutted the critics of the federal structure.4 9
The Md. COHR, like most state civil rights agencies, has two distinct and
separate functions. One function is quasi-judicial, and is performed by com-
missioners appointed by the governor.5 The commissioners in this role adjudicate
specific cases and issue appropriate orders of relief. With increasing case loads
many states have substituted hearing examiners for the commissioners.5 The
second function is administrative and involves the agency's professional staff
which processes the specific charges of discrimination through all administrative
phases prior to the quasi-judicial determination by the commission. Commis-
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 708, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-7 (1970); Title VIII, Civil Rights Act
of 1968, 810(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1970).
45 EEOC and HUD Deferral Procedures are set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1972) and
24 C.F.R. § 105.18 '(1972), respectively. The Md. COHR and other states have been so certi-
fied: 37 Fed. Reg. 16540 (1972); 37 Fed. Reg. 9214 (1972).
46 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
47 See A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 27, at 6.
48 M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RAcIAL DIsCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 205, 208
(1966).
49 For a discussion of the administrative creativity employed by EEOC, see A. BLUMROSEN,
supra note 27 at 51-101. Also, for a discussion of the powers of EEOC see Blumrosen,
Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimina-
tion, 71 MACH. L. REv. 59, 94-100 '(1972).
50 The structure and procedures of the Md. COHR are contained in Sections 1 and 14,
respectively, of the M.. CODE ANN., Art. 49B (1972 Repl. Vol., 1972 Supp.). See Bonfield,
supra note 7 and Sutin, supra note 7.
51 The following states have hearing examiner systems: Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin.
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sioners, because of their quasi-judicial functions and political roles, should not
become involved in earlier administrative phases conducted by the professional
staff; but the history of commissioner involvement in these phases has been a
continuing problem undermining the effectiveness of some state agencies.
The administrative process involves five stages: the filing of a charge, in-
vestigation, determination of probable cause, conciliation and hearing.52 Most
of the challenges to civil rights agencies initially centered on procedural chal-
lenges to one or more of these stages. Federal court decisions concerning some of
the challenges to these stages have resulted in decisions of substance evolving
from the questions of procedures. A narrow view of these various stages could
effectively stultify the implementation of the civil rights laws. Successful defense
of procedural challenges is critical to the efficacy of a state agency.
A. The Complaint
The filing of a complaint is the initial stage under the civil rights law and
triggers the subsequent law enforcement process. Usually a complaint can be
filed by either an aggrieved party or members of the agency itself.5" The com-
plaint and its scope have been one of the most litigated areas in the civil rights
field primarily on the federal level. This litigation, however, has produced gen-
erally favorable results.5 4 The complainant is no longer viewed as a mere in-
dividual seeking to make himself whole; rather he is considered a private at-
torney general vindicating not only his rights, but the rights of all those persons
similarly situated.5 The very term "discrimination" has been defined to mean
unlawful conduct directed at a class.5"
It is the policy of both federal and state agencies that a complainant is not
to be charged with having full knowledge of civil rights law. The complainant
may believe that discrimination has occurred but may be unable to perceive or
understand all the sources, effects, patterns or practices of a respondent's system
upon his own personal case of discrimination. A charge of discrimination merely
triggers the agency's investigatory and conciliatory procedures. Civil rights laws
contemplate the filing of charges by persons who are untutored in the techni-
calities of the law and who may not be able to fully articulate their grievances.
It is now established that the charge of discrimination is not considered a formal
52 MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 49B, § 14 (1972 Repl. Vol., 1972 Supp.); Sutin, supra note 7,
at 1013-40. The administrative structure of many state agencies in form and operation is
patterned after the National Labor Relations Board, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970); see, City of
Highland Park v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 364 Mich. 508, 111 N.W.2d 797
(1961); Arnett v. Seattle Gen. Hosp., 65 Wash. 2d 22, 395, P.2d 503 (1964).
53 The party filing a complaint is designated the "Complainant." The party against whom
a complaint is filed is designated the "Respondent."
54 Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d
28 (5th Cir. 1968); Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971); Sanchez
v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 '(5th Cir. 1970); King v. Georgia Power Co., 295
F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122
(5th Cir. 1969); Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969); Marquez v.
Omaha District Sales, 440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1970); Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d
32 (4th Cir. 1971).
55 Newton v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); Jenkins v. United
Gas Corp., supra note 54 at 33.
56 Hall v. Wertham Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
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pleading which limits the scope of the agency's investigatory-conciliatory process
to those allegations which are explicitly raised in the charge.57
B. Investigation
The investigation of a complaint involves several steps. After the agency's
professional staff has analyzed the initial complaint and conducted a preliminary
inquiry, it must identify the issues involved in the case. This process often in-
volves an inquiry which extends beyond the scope of the original complaint. 58
For example, the initial complaint may charge racial discrimination in an
employer's promotional practices. While the agency's inquiry may indeed con-
firm the original charge, it might also reveal suspect employment practices in-
volving hiring and recruiting. The investigation could further reveal discrimi-
natory employment practices on the basis of sex. Identification of possible sex
discrimination could expand the scope of the initial complaint to include sex as
well as race.
The policy underlying such an expanded scope investigatory technique is
implicit in the administrative process. The Supreme Court defined the power
of the administrative agency to set investigative machinery into motion in United
States v. Morton Salt Co.:
[An administrative agency] has a power of inquisition, if one chooses to call
it that, which is not derived from the judicial function. It is more analogous
to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy for
power to get evidence but can investigate merely on the suspicion that the
law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.59
The Morton Salt doctrine has been applied to federal civil rights agencies and
state administrative agencies.6"
Under Title VII, which is identical in all substantive respects to most state
fair employment practices laws, federal court decisions have established that the
investigation by the EEOC or others is not limited to the specific allegations
recited in the initial charge, but may encompass any matter like and related to,
or growing out of, the original charge. In Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc.61 the
complainant alleged sex discrimination in her complaint but failed to allege
discrimination based upon national origin. The federal court held that the
Sanchez charge triggered the Commission's investigation. The scope of the
judicial complaint is only confined to the scope of the EEOC investigation which
can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.62 The
key terms of the Sanchez doctrine are subject to expansion: "like and related to"
57 Jenkins v. United Gas Corp, supra note 54.
58 Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., supra note 54, at 466.
59 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950).
60 Bowaters Southern Paper Corp. v. EEOC, 428 F.2d 799, 800 (6th Cir. 1970); Vulcan
Waterproofers, Inc. v. Maryland Home Improvement Comm'n, 253 Md. 204, 252 A.2d 62
(1969).
61 Supra note 54, at 458.
62 Id. at 466, 467, citing with approval King v. Georgia Power Co., suprra note 53 at 947.
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may be defined as similar and relevant. 3 For example, patterns of discrimination
in discharge are relevant to determine whether discrimination has occurred in
hiring.64 Information concerning a hiring pattern is relevant to determine dis-
crimination in promotion. 5 Discrimination in promotion is relevant to determine
discrimination in hiring.6 Hiring involves initial job assignment so hiring pat-
terns are also relevant.6 The company's general hiring practices at other plants
in the state are relevant.68
An agency's legislative mandate usually requires the elimination of all
forms of discrimination. 9 If discrimination is identified, whether by initial
complaint or during the course of an investigation, that discrimination must be
acted upon by the law enforcement agency. If the state agency identified dis-
crimination, but chose to ignore it merely because it was not alleged by the
original lay complaint, this conduct could amount to nonfeasance similar to a
police officer called to a bank to investigate a public nuisance complaint and
who then ignored a robbery in progress. Failure of the agency to act on dis-
covered but unalleged matters could also be construed as unconstitutional state
action permitting unlawful discrimination to continue unabated."0
These decisions take on significant meaning for state agencies by allowing
them the opportunity to broaden their inquiries and seek class-directed relief.
Implementation of these federal concepts at the state level is critical to the future
effectiveness of state agencies. Failure to effectuate the transition to federal
standards could erode the intent of Congress to implement federal laws at a
local level.
C. Special Problems
Subpoena power is a basic investigatory tool for a state civil rights agency.
While federal agencies, primarily EEOC, have been accorded ease of access to
records during investigation, the state experience has not been so happy. For
example, in State ex rel. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n v. Adolph Coors Corp.,"'
the Colorado Court of Appeals substantially impeded the efforts of the state
agency to broadly investigate charges of employment discrimination. Failure to
obtain adequate documentation to support a charge of discrimination is the most
serious administrative problem encountered by the state agency. Fortunately,
however, state decisional law is not uniform."2 In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
63 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., supra note 53.
64 Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, supra note 53, at 358.
65 Marquez v. Omaha District Sales, supra note 53.
66 Graniteville v. EEOC, supra note 53, at 37.
67 Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970); Mabin v. Lear
Siegler, Inc., 457 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1972).
68 Madlock v. Sardis Luggage Co., 302 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
69 MD. ANN. COD., Art. 49B § 13(b) (1972 Repl. Vol.).
70 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386 (1947); Gilliam v. City of Omaha, supra note 2; see also Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F.
Supp. 83 '(S.D. Ohio 1967); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 44 Ohio Op. 2d
468, 238 N.E.2d 839 (1968), cert. denied 396 U.S. 1004 (1970).
71 29 Colo. App. 240, 486 P.2d 43 (1971).
72 Nevada Comm'n on Equal Rights of Citizens v. Smith, 80 Nev. 469, 396 P.2d 677
(1964); D.C. Human Relations Comm'n v. National Geographic Soc'y, 475 F.2d 366 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
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v. City of New York Commission on Human Rights,"s a New York court took a
more liberal view of civil rights enforcement by holding the agency possessed
implicit authority to investigate. In this regard, state courts would do well to
heed the words of Justice Frankfurter that ". . . courts and administrative
agencies are collaborative 'instrumentalities of justice,' and not business rivals."
7
It should be noted that state agencies usually possess some form of rule-
making authority, either substantive or procedural, the use of which can aid an
investigative process that traditionally has had to rely upon a respondent's co-
operation.7 1 Use of the rule-making power in this investigation stage is a neces-
sary adjunct to decisional law since one must possess the tools to investigate
before discrimination can be established. The Md. COHR has adopted rules of
procedures that provide serious administrative sanctions against those who fail
to cooperate with the agency staff during an investigation. 8 Should information
be withheld, a respondent could be held liable on the merits of a charge without
further proceedings. At least one other state imposes similar sanctions.77
D. Probable Cause
After the investigation phase is completed, the results are set out in a written
finding which describes the scope of the inquiry, identifies the issues, and con-
tains determinations as to whether there is probable cause to believe that the law
has been violated. A probable cause decision against a respondent usually gen-
erates indignation, denials, and attacks upon the agency's impartiality. Often
there are attempts to involve commissioners at this stage and convince them the
agency should reverse the findings or otherwise suppress the complaint without
benefit of a hearing.
Such results indicate that the function of probable cause has been miscon-
ceived. It is clearly not the purpose of probable cause to determine conclusively
that a respondent's conduct or practice is unlawful. That judgment should be
made only at hearing. The sole purpose of the probable cause determination is
to serve as an administrative device to sift out frivolous complaints and to trigger
subsequent administrative proceedings."9
The determination of probable cause, unlike its namesake in criminal law,
is not subject to independent review. In United States u. International Associa-
tion of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local No. I," the
federal court denied defendant's motion to require discovery of facts supporting
the Justice Department's "reasonable cause" belief. The legislative history of
73 39 App. Div. 2d 860, 332 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1972).
74 United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287, 295 (1946) (citations omitted).
75 Sutin, supra note 7, at 1023. For discussion of a state civil rights agency's rule-making
power, see Ross v. Arbury, 206 Misc. 74, 133 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Sup. Ct. 1954); New Jersey
Builders, Owners and Managers Ass'n v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 288 A.2d 855 (1972).
76 MARYLAND COMAI'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS, RULES OF PROCEDURE (1973). These
were adopted May 8, 1973, and approved by the Attorney General July 6, 1973.
77 NEw JERSEY DIVISIoN ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.
78 MrD. ANN. CODE, Art. 49B § 13(a) (1972 Repl. Vol.).
79 A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 27, at 84-89; Developments in the Law - Employment Dis-
crimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARVARD L. REv. 1109, 1204-06
(1971).
80 438 F.2d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 1971).
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section 707 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964± supports the view that the Attorney
General's "reasonable cause" belief is not a litigable issue. As Congressman
Celler, floor manager in the House, stated:
Finally, the statute contains the usual directive to the Attorney Gen-
eral that he should have a reasonable case before he sues, but of course, he-
not the court-decides whether reasonable cause exists, and the issue of
reasonable cause does not present a separate litigable issue .
2
Federal courts have denied motions for interrogatories aimed at discovery of the
factual basis for determination of the Attorney General's reasonable cause belief.
A similar conclusion as to the power to review the finding of probable
cause was made in Wilson v. Sixty-Six Melmore Gardenss where the state court
decided that the alleged lack of investigation prior to the New Jersey Division on
Civil Rights' finding of probable cause was irrelevant to the merits of the ad-
judication on full hearing. In Board of Education u. State Division of Human
Rights4 the respondent sought to have a finding of probable cause made by the
staff of New York Human Rights Commission vacated because of the absence of
a statutory procedure to review the finding of probable cause. The respondent
there challenged the finding on the grounds that absence of review denied
procedural due process. In the words of the court:
[No violation of procedural due process can be spelled out of a statutory
scheme which requires notice and affords a plenary opportunity to be heard
on the subject matter of the complaint.
8 5
The probable cause decision should be accorded the same dignity as other dis-
cretionary governmental functions which are subject to later review only if fraud
or bad faith are present.8 6
E. Conciliation
Conciliation is a process of negotiation, usually tripartite in nature, which
involves the complainant, the respondent, and the agency itself.8" During this
process the agency operates under a specific legislative mandate to eliminate all
discrimination identified in the previous stages. The agency's professional staff
serves as an active participant-mediator between the complainant and the
respondent. While the agency should seek to vindicate the rights of the com-
plainant pursuant to its obligation under both state and federal laws, the com-
plainant represents not only an individual, but a class as well, since by definition
the term "discrimination" has been held to be class-directed.88 Therefore, the
81 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970).
82 110 CONG. REC. 15895 (1964).
83 106 N.J. Super. 182, 254 A.2d 545 (1969).
84 68 Misc. 2d 1035, 330 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
85 Id. at 1038, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
86 See, e.g., Sollins v. Baltimore County, 253 Md. 407, 252 A.2d 819 (1969). Contra,
Jeanpierre v. Arbury, 4 N.Y.2d 238, 149 N.E.2d 238, 173 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1958) (dismissed;
complaint held reviewable).
87 See, A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 27, at 150.
88 Hall v. Wertham Bag Corp., supra note 56.
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conciliation stage must involve negotiating complete remedial action that will
vindicate both the rights of the public and the rights of the individual.
Conciliation is fraught with pitfalls to effective enforcement of the law.
Traditionally, state agencies have had a penchant to settle cases at all costs and
thus avoid a hearing. 9 Many times this occurred at the expense of either the
complainant or the class or both. Aside from an agency's historical timidity, out-
side pressures can impede the conciliation process. The more local the commis-
sion, the more susceptible it is to political influence, as commissioners and others
may seek to "advise" the professional staff on the merits of settlement in a
particular case.
Conciliation is not a forum for the review of evidence obtained by the
agency or past civic accomplishments of the respondent. For conciliation to be
effective, it must result in an enforceable agreement which eliminates and not
merely ameliorates discrimination. If such an agreement is not obtained, the case
should proceed to the following stage.
F. Evidentiary Hearing, Administrative Order and Judicial Review
At this point in the administrative process, the respondent has an option.
Should the respondent disagree with the professional staff's probable cause
determination, the respondent can avoid completely or terminate the concilia-
tion stage and demand a plenary evidentiary hearing. The hearing is admin-
istrative in nature but follows a trial-type format which permits direct and cross-
examination and other traditional evidentiary devices. After the hearing, should
the respondent's practices be found in view of all the evidence to be unlawful, the
agency then will issue an order compelling the respondent to cease and desist
from the unlawful practices or to take such other affirmative action which may
be necessary to effectuate the purposes of law."
Following the issuance of the order, either party usually has the right to
obtain judicial review of the agency's action. At this point in the administrative
process two problems have developed which can impede prompt enforcement of
civil rights laws. The problems have resulted from a legislative and judicial
attitude that state civil rights agencies are not traditional administrative agencies
and therefore need not be treated as such.91 For example, the filing of the ap-
peal from an administrative agency decision is usually required within a specified
period. Failure to file a timely administrative appeal normally operates as an
absolute bar to judicial review. However, in State Division of Human Rights v.
Bystricky,92 a respondent in contempt of the state agency's order failed to file a
timely appeal, but nevertheless was given an opportunity for full judicial review.
The same holding occurred in State of Maryland Commission on Human Rela-
89 Sutin, supra note 7, at 1035.
90 There is a difference among the states regarding the specificity with which the various
laws set forth the agency's remedial authority. Some state laws are specific regarding authority
to award compensatory damages, others are not. Maryland belongs to the latter group. MD.
ANN. CoD, Art. 49B § 14(e) (1972 Repl. Vol.).
91 Sutin, supra note 7, at 1043.
92 30 N.Y.2d 322, 284 N.E.2d 560 (1972).
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tions v. Armco Steel Corp.93 The effect of these procedural rulings adds time and
expense to an administrative process which is already lengthy.94 Another problem
involves the fact that the actions of civil rights agencies are often given less
weight than normally given to other types of administrative decisions. Often a
reviewing court will substitute its judgment for that of the civil rights agency in
regard to weight-accorded evidence and inferences drawn from the evidence.95
IV. Interpretation of State Civil Rights Law
If state civil rights agencies are to be effective, it depends upon how broadly
they develop and apply the law. The other stages of the administrative process,
investigation and conciliation, are dependent upon the establishment of a strong,
viable agency. Consequently, a state civil rights agency is only effective to the




One criticism of state agencies has been that they have failed to develop a
body of law defining discrimination.98 While there is still a paucity of state
decisional law, sufficient law has now evolved from both federal and state court
decisions to aid the understanding of state civil rights laws.
The traditional concept of discrimination has been unequal treatment of
the races. A black must receive the same treatment as a similarly situated white;
otherwise the disparity in treatment constitutes discrimination."7 As a simple
example, in the rental of an apartment, blacks cannot be subjected to more
stringent standards than those applied to whites."
In the fields of public accommodations and housing, state agencies have
not only applied the unequal treatment concept but also have expanded its
coverage. In Clover Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v. Goldsboro," a New Jersey
court applied substance over form to defeat the respondent's claim of private club
status. Several other state decisions have followed this approach."' 0 In Wilson
v. Sixty-Six Melmore Gardens,' the New Jersey court rejected the respondent's
defense that the complainant had not formally offered to lease the apartment
93 5 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES DECISIONS 8578 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1972).
94 Cramton, Causes and Cures of Administrative Delay, 58 A.B.A.J. 937 (1972).
95 See City of Philadelphia v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 7 Pa. Cmwlth. 500, 300
A.2d 97 (1972); Adolph Coors Co. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, Colo. App., 502 P.2d
1113 (1972); Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Comm'n on Civil Rights, 153 Conn. 170, 215 A.2d 130
(1965) ; contra, Arnett v. Seattle Gen. Hosp., supra note 52.
96 A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 27, at 19-20.
97 Wilson v. Sixty-Six Melmore Gardens, supra note 83.
98 Stearns v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 6 Cal. 3d 205, 98 Cal. Rptr. 467, 490
P.2d 1155 (1971).
99 47 N.J. 25, 219 A.2d 161 (1966).
100 In re Holiday Sands, Inc., 9 Race Rel. L. Rep. 2025 (1964); Castle Hill Beach Club v.
Arbury, 2 N.Y.2d 596, 142 N.E.2d 186, 162 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
101 Supra note 83.
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he sought. The court held this law was broadly designed to prohibit all forms of
discrimination including conduct which tended to discourage the complainant
from pursuing his rights. Other states have also followed this approach in hous-
ing cases .'
2
One area where states have been particularly active is the formulation of
remedies for victims of housing discrimination. States quite often developed new
concepts of compensatory damages, including damages for humiliation, mental
anguish, and pain and suffering, before federal decisions did so. A progressive
line of state authority has upheld such remedies formulated by state agencies.
New Jersey, for example, in Jackson v. Concord CoP.' held at first that the state
civil rights agency possessed authority to award compensatory damages for
economic loss. New Jersey later extended this authority in Zahorian v. Russell
Fitt Real Estate Agency,"" and also sanctioned the award of compensatory
damages to include pain and suffering damages. In State Commission for
Human Rights v. Speer"'5 damages for pain and suffering awarded by the state
agency were upheld by the New York Court of Appeals. Also, in Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination v. Franzaroli,' the state agency's award of
mental suffering damages was upheld. An Oregon court has upheld an award of
humiliation damages in Williams v. Joyce.'0 These decisions are especially
significant since each court allowed the damages to be awarded without a specific
statutory reference to compensatory damages.
The employment field represents an area where state agencies still expe-
rience difficulty in defining the law. States have still remained complaint-
orientated and failed to examine possible systematic discrimination' 0 9 The
Supreme Court has recently announced several significant employment discrimi-
nation decisions which interpret civil rights laws broadly and can be readily
applied to state laws. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,- 0 the Court defined dis-
crimination to include the unequal effect of an employer's conduct and not his
intent or motivation. The Court also held unlawful the use of certain employ-
ment practices which, although neutral on their face, operated to exclude minor-
ities from the work force. The Court excepted those practices which can be
shown to be job-related. In McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green,"' the Court
while applying the Griggs unequal effect concept to an individual plaintiff also
established minimum standards of proof in employment discrimination cases
necessary to establish a prima facie case. This then places on the employer the
burden to justify that the challenged employment practice is not a "pretextual"
102 Elgart v. Pa. Human Rights Comm'n, 4 Pa. Cmwlth. 616, 287 A.2d 887 (1972); State
ex rel. Balfour v. Bergeron, 290 Minn. 351, 187 N.W.2d 680 (1971).
103 54 N.J. 113, 253 A.2d 793 '(1969).
104 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973).
105 29 N.Y.2d 555, 272 N.E.2d 884, 324 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1971).
106 357 Mass. 112, 256 N.E.2d 311 (1970).
107 4 Ore. App. 482, 479 P.2d 513 (1971).
108 See note 90, swpra; see also Rody v. Hollis, 81 Wash. 2d 88, 500 P.2d 97 (1972).
109 Compare Marshall v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 21 Cal. App. 3d 680, 98 Cal.
Reptr. 698 (1971) and Adolph Coors Co. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, supra note 95, with
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973).
110 Supra note 36. The Griggs unequal effect concept has also been applied to housing in
United States v. Real Estate Development Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
111 Supra note 109.
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device which operates as a cloak for discriminatory practices. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has further accorded considerable dignity to the local civil rights
agency by its ruling in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations."' There the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the local com-
mission's order in an employment discrimination case.
It is still too early to evaluate how state agencies will respond to these
decisions. Like the earlier decision in Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission
v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.,"' the opportunity is now clearly presented for
state agencies to establish and pursue policies of broad civil rights enforcement.
2. Maryland Law
In 1970 the Md. COHR first began to vigorously enforce its newly acquired
mandate through the administrative hearing process. During that year the Com-
mission held its first public hearing involving an employment case. In Jones v.
American Totalizator.4 the Commission issued a comprehensive order that re-
quired the respondent to alter its hiring and recruiting system. Its system had
been found to have had the effect of perpetuating the all-white nature of re-
spondent's work force. The complainant, however, was found not to have been
a victim of the discriminatory system and was left without relief by the Com-
mission. The respondent fully complied with the Commission's order without
the necessity of judicial intervention.
The Jones case involved a turnabout from the Commission's past role as a
mere adviser in the field of civil rights. Jones was particularly significant since
it represented the first time a Maryland employer had been cited by a state
agency for discriminatory practices and ordered to take remedial actions. Since
Jones the Commission has engaged in a continuing fact-finding activity while
interpreting its powers in a broad and comprehensive manner.
Later, in Harp v. Vernon's Roller Skating Rink,"5 the Commission ruled
in the area of public accommodations holding that a roller-skating rink was
covered by the law and could not exclude blacks from using the facility under
the guise of being a private club. The case also involved a significant procedural
ruling that the Commissioners in their quasi-judicial capacity could not exercise
a supervisory role over the Commission staff conciliation efforts. The respondent
in Harp failed to comply with the Commission's order to take affirmative action
to advertise the facility as a public accommodation throughout the Baltimore
metropolitan area. Consequently, the Commission instituted an action in which
it sought and obtained its first enforcement order."'
In Valcourt v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 7 the Commission
ruled an employment practice unlawful, but this time awarded the complainant
compensatory damages. The Commission ruled by a split vote of the hearing
panel that the complainant was entitled to back pay as a result of the respon-
112 93 S. Ct. 2553 '(1973).
113 Supra note 26.
114 Md. COHR No. FEP 70-796 (June 22, 1971).
115 Md. COHR No. P.A. 70-453 (Sept. 24, 1971).
116 Md. COHR v. Bush, Cir. Ct. for Baltimore Co., Equity No. 71555 (Feb. 16, 1972).
117 Md. COHR No. FEP 70-918 (Jan. 12, 1972).
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dent's discriminatory practice regarding sex and that the Commission had
authority to make such an award. Meanwhile, the Commission, using its in-
itiatory powers, had instituted its own complaint against Armco Steel Corpo-
ration. After ten days of hearings the Commission found that Armco was engaged
in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination in the promotion of front-line
supervisors and ordered Armco to promote the black employees into supervisory
jobs until blacks held twenty percent of the supervisory jobs." 8 Both Valcourt
and Armco are pending judicial review before the Circuit Courts of Howard
County and Baltimore City, respectively." 9
After the Griggs u. Duke Power Co. 2 decision, the Commission applied the
Supreme Court's rationale in Ferguson v. United Parcel Service. 2 ' Ferguson
was a black male who applied at United Parcel Service (UPS) for the position
of "truck loader-unloader." He had a prior arrest and conviction record and
had been incarcerated for nonsupport. Ferguson also had credit problems. On
the basis of these factors UPS rejected him for employment although the
company admitted Ferguson could do the job. The Commission reviewed
evidence that such job selection factors tended to adversely affect blacks and that
the company could not justify their use as job-related. The UPS selection system
was ruled illegal and UPS was ordered to alter its selection criteria to comply
with the law. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Prince Georges County reversed
the Commission's order on the ground the Commission's remedy exceeded the
scope of the charge. 2 2 The case is now pending before the Maryland Court of
Appeals as a case of first impression involving the scope of the Commission's
powers.
23
Since the Ferguson case, the Commission has continued to define its author-
ity in a number of cases encompassing all areas of discrimination. In Lewis v.
Cross Roads Inn12 the Commission ruled that a tavern was a place of public
accommodations and could not exclude blacks from service. For the first time,
the Commission awarded a complainant damages for the humiliation he suffered
as a result of the respondent's discriminatory treatment. In the housing area the
Commission has been particularly active, holding in a number of cases that
blacks cannot be subjected to more stringent standards than whites in either the
sale or rental of a dwelling. The Commission has also awarded substantial
damages for humiliation upon a finding of racially discriminatory housing
practices.' 25 The Commission held in Walker v. Dixie Manufacturing Cor-
118 Md. COHR No. FEP CC-1 (April 17, 1972).
119 Md. COHR v. Armco Steel Corp., Cir. Ct. for Baltimore City, Equity No. A 52698;
Md. COHR v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Cir. Ct. for Howard Co., Equity No.
8282.
120 Supra note 36.
121 Md. COHR No. FEP 70-850 (March 8, 1972).
122 6 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES DEcisioNs ff 8670 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1973).
123 Md. Ct. of App., No. 130 (Sept. Term 1973).
124 Md. COHR No. P.A. 70-436 (May 17, 1972).
125 Lord v. Malakoff, Md. COHR No. H 71-0062 (July 20, 1972) (awarding $1,500);
Primrose v. Shannon & Luchs, Realtors, Md. COHR No. 71-0033 (April 3, 1973) (awarding
$985); Mosely v. Aldon Management Corp., Md. COHR No. H 72-0312 (April 10, 1972)
(awarding $250); Scott v. Diamond, Md. COHR No. H 72-0194 (April 19, 1973) (awarding
$150); King v. B. J. & G. W. Frederick, Inc., Md. COHR No. H 71-0011 (May 17, 1973)




pany 126 that a no probable cause finding would not bar a complainant at hear-
ing from pursuing his charge of racial discrimination in employment once con-
ciliation failed on other issues. The theory of this case was later confirmed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green." ' And in Bailey
v. Holiday Inn,12' a case which was reduced to a Commission consent order, the
Commission ordered compensatory damages of $1,200 in response to a charge of
sex discrimination in employment for the respondent's failure to promote a
female.
To date the Commission has issued orders in eighteen cases and although
several of the Commission orders have been voluntarily obeyed, the Commission
is involved in litigation of several of its orders throughout the state.
B. Administrative Interpretation
Another criticism leveled against state agencies concerned their past failure
to administratively define their laws.'29 It has been recommended that admin-
istrative agencies articulate their policies and standards as a means of reducing
the number of case-by-case adjudications occasioned by the lack of defined
agency policy. 3 ° This recommendation is particularly applicable to civil rights
agencies.
The EEOC experiences illustrate the success of this approach. EEOC has
developed a series of guidelines interpreting Title VII. In Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. 3' the Supreme Court reviewed with favor the EEOC Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures and stated that such administrative guidelines
are entitled to great deference by a reviewing court.' 32 This deference to admin-
istrative interpretation of the law was also applied in the housing field.' 8
Like the EEOC, a state civil rights agency has a similar opportunity to
interpret the scope of the state civil rights laws by promulgating a number of in-
terpretative guidelines. These guidelines should be accorded great weight by the
state courts. The Md. COHR has followed this approach. In the employmeq
area, the Commission has issued guidelines concerning employee selection tech-
niques, and sex and religious discrimination. 34 In the housing sector the Com-
mission has issued guidelines concerning fair housing recruitment' 5 and the
lending practices of financial institutions.'36
126 Md. COHR No. FEP 70-973 (March 13, 1973).
127 Supra note 111.
128 Md. COHR No. FEP 71-390 (June 19, 1973).
129 A. BLUNROSBN, supra note 27, at 19-20.
130 Cramton, supra note 94, at 941.
131 Supra note 36.
132 Id. at 433-34.
133 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
134 MARYLAND COMM'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS, GUIDELINES ON EiPLOYEE SELECTION
PROCEDURES, SEx DISCRIMINATION GUIDELINES AND GUIDELINES ON RELIGIOUS DISCRIM-
INATION (1972).
135 MARYLAND COMM'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS, GUIDELINES ON FAIR HOUSING LAW
(1972).
136 MARYLAND COMM'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS, HOUSING FINANCE GUIDELINES '(1973).
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V. Constitutional Requirements
State civil rights agencies operate under a constitutional obligation to
enforce federally protected rights. In effect, the state agency must provide the
same rights and remedies in the civil rights field that are available in federal
court. This principle has two constitutional sources, the supremacy clause'"' and
fourteenth amendment.3
In Testa v. Katt,3 0 the Supreme Court held that a state court could not,
under the supremacy clause, deviate from national policy and ignore the full
application of federal rights. Also, for this same reason, the Court in Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, Inc." reversed the decision of Virginia courts for their
failure to act in accordance with federal standards.
The failure of the state to affirmatively seek out and eliminate discrimina-
tion makes the state an instrument of that discrimination. In Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority the Court stated: "[N]o State may effectively abdicate
its responsibilities by either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge
them. .. ."' If the state does not act, it becomes a joint participant in the
illegal discrimination by allowing it to continue unabated. 4 2
Consequently, the approach taken in Gilliam v. City of Omaha24 3 was
based upon sound authority. There a federal district court stated that the
Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission must enforce not only state civil
rights laws but also fourteenth amendment prohibitions against discrimination.
In holding that the state commission could not avoid awarding remedies avail-
able under the federal civil rights scheme, the court said:
If punitive damages are necessary to fully vindicate a Constitutional
right, when that right is before a federal court, then such damages are
every bit as necessary when that right is before a state administrative com-
mission or a state court. Basic Federal Constitutional rights cannot be
watered down by state statutes or state court opinions.'4
The practical application of these principles to state civil rights agencies
means that the agency itself must develop its administrative decisions and in-
terpretations to coincide with minimal federal standards. Indeed, the federal
civil rights enforcement program has been characterized as a cooperative venture
with state agencies to eliminate discrimination. Accordingly, state agencies have
been extended an invitation to join this effort. 45
137 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. State courts have the power and a duty to enforce rights
secured by the Federal Constitution and laws enacted thereunder. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan.
459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
138 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
139 Supra note 70.
140 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
141 Supra note 70, at 725.
142 See State ex rel. Balfour v. Bergeron, supra note 102; see also Etheridge v. Rhodes,
268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967) and Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College District, supra
note 70.
143 Supra note 2.
144 Id. at 8 (citation omitted).
145 Address by William H. Brown II, Chairman of the EEOC, before the International




If state civil rights agencies are to operate as viable entities within the
concept of federalism, they must apply rights and remedies equivalent to federal
law. 4' Failure to do so raises three obvious results:
1. Federal courts, which may eventually review the actions of state agencies,
as illustrated by Cooper u. Philip Morris, Inc.,4 ' will accord little respect to those
actions, not only rendering the state agency's action a wasteful use of taxpayers'
funds, but also working an unnecessary hardship on some complainants.
2. State agencies which hold themselves out to the public as designed to
vindicate civil rights will be effectively rendered a sham organization unable to
fulfill that purpose. By the time a state complainant has learned that his rights
are not to be fully vindicated at the state level, he may have lost his federal rights.
3. State agencies which water down civil rights will find that the federal
government will quickly preempt its functions.
The purpose of this article has not been to suggest that state agencies are to
operate as carbon copies of the federal civil rights structure. State agencies
provide a unique forum where new and creative approaches can be designed
to eliminate discrimination and meet the needs of the particular state. Certainly
the present case backlog at the federal level indicates that the need exists for
state agencies to participate in the civil rights field. Experience has shown there
is sufficient discrimination to support the existence of civil rights agencies at all
levels, federal, state and local. To maintain their "separate but equal" status, the
state agencies must accept the federal invitation to eliminate all forms of dis-
crimination.
146 Address by William H. Brown II, before the International Association of Human Rights
Commissions, July 18, 1973.
147 Supra note 4.
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